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WHO Is LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
UNDER TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE &
REMEDIES CODE SECTION 38.001 IN
BREACH OF CONTRACT LITIGATION?
Gregory Scott Crespi*
I. INTRODUCTION
ECTION 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code is a
broad attorney's fees statute that allows a person to recover reason-
able attorney's fees from an "individual or corporation" if "the
claim is for: ... an oral or written contract."1 This rather terse statute
raises a number of issues regarding its scope of application.2 In this Arti-
cle, I will focus on a single, narrow, and practically important question
that the statute presents: who qualifies as either an "individual" or a "cor-
poration" who may, under some circumstances, be held liable for the
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; J.D.,
Yale Law School; Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1. The full text of that statute reads:
§ 38.001 Recovery of Attorney's Fees
A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or cor-
poration, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is
for: (1) rendered services; (2) performed labor; (3) furnished material; (4)
freight or express overcharges; (5) lost or damaged freight or express; (6)
killed or injured stock; (7) a sworn account; or (8) an oral or written contract.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2011).
2. Let me briefly note a few of the legal questions that come to mind when one
considers this short statute: Does the fact that the statute states that it applies to claims
"for: ... an oral or written contract," rather than using the seemingly more apt phrase "for
the breach of an oral or written contract," have any significance? See id. Is one entitled to
recover their attorney's fees if one prevails on a breach of contract claim but is awarded no
damages or prevails in a declaratory judgment action? How does the statute apply, if at all,
to counterclaims? To what extent, if any, is this provision precluded by later statutes that
may exempt certain breach of contract actions from its scope? Does the statute allow a
person who successfully defends against a breach of contract suit to also recover their at-
torney's fees? Does the statute allow recovery of attorney's fees under circumstances
where a person is able to establish all of the elements of an oral contract and of its breach,
but cannot satisfy an applicable Statute of Frauds; is such a claim "valid?" Does the statute
apply to all breach of contract litigation taking place in Texas state courts, or only to those
cases where Texas law provides the substantive decision rules? Does it apply in the courts
of other states with regard to contracts whose substantive provisions are governed by Texas
law? How does it apply, if at all, to federal court litigation taking place in Texas or else-
where? Does the statute limit the liability of a client for his own attorney's fees if a defen-
dant whom the statute requires to pay attorney's fees cannot make the required payments?
Some of these questions have been addressed to some extent by court decisions and
some have not, but I will not address any of the issues noted above in this short Article.
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other party's attorney's fees in a breach of contract action? 3
Suppose, for example, that the defendant that is found liable in a
breach of contract action is a partnership, limited partnership,4 limited
liability company, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
trust fund, or some other kind of non-corporate legal entity. Would such
a defendant be regarded as either an "individual" or a "corporation"
under the statute who would then potentially be held liable for the pre-
vailing party's attorney's fees? What if the defendant is a non-profit cor-
poration or a municipal or other governmental corporation? Does the
statutory term "corporation" include these kinds of legal entities as well
as ordinary profit-seeking private corporations?
In Part II of this short Article, I will review some of the relevant legis-
lative commentary accompanying the adoption of section 38.001 and the
subsequent case law applying the provision that addresses these ques-
tions. In Part III, I will discuss whether the courts have correctly inter-
preted this statute as to the classes of defendants that it covers and how
the Texas Supreme Court, in a proper case, might clarify the scope of
application of the statute given its current language. I will also suggest
some possible amendments to the statute that could be enacted by the
Texas legislature to make its intended scope clearer.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE "INDIVIDUAL OR
CORPORATION" CLAUSE OF SECTION 38.001
A. THE RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE COMMENTARY ACCOMPANYING
THE ADOPTION OF SECTION 38.001
Before considering the case law addressing the scope of section 38.001,
it is important to note that prior to its 1986 adoption, the relevant statute
in this area was article 2226 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 5 That
prior statute used different language than does section 38.001 to describe
3. Once it has been determined which entities qualify as either an "individual" or a
"corporation" for the purposes of this statute, further issues arise as to the status of an
entity that qualifies under the statute at the time it entered into the contract at issue but
then changes its legal status to that of a non-qualifying entity either after it forms the
contract but before it breaches the contract or after breach but prior to the award of a
judgment against it. Similar issues arise as to a non-qualifying entity that enters into a
contract but then changes its legal status prior to breaching the contract or as to a non-
qualifying entity that enters into a contract but then changes its legal status after breaching
the contract but before a judgment is entered against it. I will not address these changes of
legal status issues presented by the statute in this short Article.
While section 38.001 does not provide for any exceptions from the potential liability of
individuals and corporations for attorney's fees, there are some subsequent statutory en-
actments that may shelter some parties who might otherwise be liable. For example, sec-
tion 38.006 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides that section 38.001 does
not apply to certain insurance contracts. WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, TEXAS LrIGATION
GUIDE § 22.20(2)(a)(iii) (2011). A complete discussion of the various statutory exceptions
to section 38.001 is outside the scope of this short Article.
4. Or, for that matter, a limited liability partnership or a limited liability limited
partnership.
5. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson, 839 S.W.2d 880, 890-91 (Tex. App.-Austin
1992, no writ).
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both the parties who may seek to recover their attorney's fees in a breach
of contract action and the parties who may be held liable for those fees.6
Article 2226 stated that "any person, corporation, partnership, or other
legal entity" with a valid contract claim against "a person or corporation"
could recover their attorney's fees from the latter party.7 Section 38.001
replaced article 2226 in 1986 and substituted the term "person" for the
phrase "person, corporation, partnership or other legal entity" in the first
part of the statute, and section 38.001 also substituted the term "individ-
ual" for the term "person" in the second part of the statute. 8
Section 38.001 was explicitly intended by the Texas legislature only to
recodify the preexisting law in this area and not to introduce any substan-
tive changes. 9 Section 38.001 did, however, make a couple of changes in
wording from the text of article 2226, one of which could easily be inter-
preted as altering its scope. The revisor's note to section 38.001 to some
extent clarifies the legislative intent of these changes, but as I will discuss
below, the note leaves some important questions unaddressed.
The recodification of article 2226 by section 38.001 in 1986 appears to
have been motivated primarily by the desire to preserve the existing law
in light of the adoption of the Texas Code Construction Act the prior
year. 10 The revisor's note to section 38.001 first of all notes that the Code
Construction Act included in its definition of a "person" a "corporation,
partnership or other legal entity." The term "person" is now statutorily
defined broadly and unambiguously to be synonymous with the more
cumbersome "person, corporation, partnership or other legal entity"
phrase of article 2226 as to the class of claimants who would potentially
be eligible to recover their attorney's fees under section 38.001.11 The
simplifying substitution of the term "person" for the longer phrase was
therefore made in the new statute.
More interestingly, however, the revisor's note also made clear the pri-
mary reason for the substitution of the term "individual" in the second
part of section 38.001 for the prior article 2226 term "person." That term
was deliberately changed so as to avoid application of the broad new
Code Construction Act definition of "person" noted above as to the par-
ties potentially subject to liability for attorney's fees. 12 The objective
here was to statutorily ratify the prior "source law" as to a limitation that
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty., 901 S.W.2d 783, 785-86 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1995, writ denied).
9. "Although the codification of the attorney's-fees statute changed the class subject
to recovery of attorney's-fees from 'a person or corporation' to 'an individual or corpora-
tion,' the Act codifying the attorney's fees statute was 'intended as a recodification only,
and no substantive change in the law' was intended." Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 839
S.W.2d at 891 (citing 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws, at 3322).
10. Base-Seal, Inc., 901 S.W.2d at 786.
11. Id.
12. TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE: A NONSUB-
STANTIVE REVISION OF THE STATUTES RELATING TO CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CIVIL REME-
DIES AND LIABILITIES 178 (1984).
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had been judicially imposed on the class of entities that had been held
liable for attorney's fees as a "person" under the article 2226 case law.13
The specific concern expressed in that revisor's note was that if this
change in wording to the term "individual" was not made, then the term
''person" in the second part of the statute would thereafter have to be
construed under the broad and unambiguous Code Construction Act def-
inition to impose potential liability for attorney's fees upon governmental
entities, a result that the majority of courts interpreting the term "per-
son" more narrowly under article 2226 prior to the adoption of the Code
Construction Act had previously rejected. 14
The revisor's note is somewhat incomplete, however, in that it does not
specifically address whether substitution of that narrower term "individ-
ual" for "person" in section 38.001 was intended to also preclude the po-
tential liability of non-governmental, non-corporate legal entities such as
partnerships, limited liability companies, and ERISA trust funds-enti-
ties that would also clearly qualify as "persons" under the broad new
Code Construction Act definition.15 A facially plausible and conven-
tional reading of the new term "individual" to apply only to human be-
ings would exclude such legal entities.16 However, if the term
"individual" was interpreted in this way, section 38.001 would arguably
go beyond being a mere recodification of article 2226 and its later judicial
interpretations that excluded governmental entities from potential liabil-
ity. It would then change the substantive law to now also exclude private
entities that had previously been at least arguably subject to attorney's
fees liability as "persons" under the prior statute, in contradiction of the
expressed legislative intent to not make any substantive changes in the
law. 17 The proper interpretation of the term "individual" in section
38.001 is thus not immediately apparent, given this tension between the
expressed legislative intent and a plain meaning interpretation of its text.
13. Base-Seal, Inc., 901 S.W.2d at 786; see also Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Nat'l Eleva-
tor Indus. Health Benefit Plan, No. 3:06-CV-1888-P, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43044, at *8-10
(N.D. Tex. June 2, 2008) (mem. op.). The revisor's note for section 38.001 apparently used
the term "source law" to refer to the 1985 case of Comm'rs Court v. Rodgers, 691 S.W.2d
753, 757 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ), which had held that article 2226 did not author-
ize recovery of attorney's fees against a county because the term "person" in that statute
was intended to refer only to individual human beings, id. at 757, and the 1982 case of City
of Austin v. N. Austin State Bank, 631 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ),
that also held that a city could not be held liable for attorney's fees under article 2226. The
drafters of the revisor's note apparently did not regard the ruling in Wickersham Ford, Inc.
v. Orange Cnty., 701 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ), that held a
county was both a "person" and a "corporation" potentially liable for attorney's fees on
either term under article 2226, a ruling later heavily criticized in Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist.,
839 S.W.2d at 891, and also rejected in Base-Seal, Inc., 901 S.W.2d at 787, as rising to the
level of "source law."
14. City of Austin, 631 S.W.2d at 568; Comm'rs Ct., 691 S.W.2d at 757; TEX. LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 178. But see Wickersham Ford, Inc., 701 S.W.2d at
348-49.
15. See TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 178.
16. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2011).
17. See Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 839 S.W.2d at 891.
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B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASES
The Texas Supreme Court has unfortunately not yet issued any opin-
ions that directly address the scope of the "individual or corporation"
phrase of section 38.001. In the 1998 case of Bohatch v. Butler & Bin-
ion,18 the court did affirm an award of attorney's fees that had been
granted under section 38.001 against a law firm partnership, but the issue
of whether a partnership qualified as an "individual or corporation"
under section 38.001 was not presented on appeal in that case. 19 So the
opinion provides only very slender and indirect support for regarding
whether partnerships qualify as "individuals or corporations" under that
statute. The questions presented as to the scope of that phrase have
therefore to this point been left for lower court resolution.
C. CASES APPLYING SECTION 38.001 TO GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
The courts have been consistent in ruling that governmental entities do
not qualify as "individuals or corporations" under section 38.001 and thus
cannot be held liable for attorney's fees in breach of contract actions. 20
They have taken that position regardless of whether the breach of con-
tract action arises out of a governmental entity's performance of govern-
mental functions or instead out of its engaging in proprietary activities. 21
Let me note that the 1985 ruling in Wickersham Ford v. Orange County22
did interpret the predecessor "person or corporation" phrase contained
in the second part of article 2226 to hold that a county qualified both as a
"person" and as a "corporation. '23 Since section 38.001 retained the
term "corporation" when it substituted the term "individual" for the term
"person" in that phrase, the Wickersham Ford opinion does provide some
support for regarding a governmental entity as qualifying as a "corpora-
tion" under section 38.001 and thus still subject to potential attorney's
fees liability under the new statute. 24 However, the Wickersham Ford
opinion has been heavily criticized by later courts,25 and no courts subse-
quently applying the section 38.001 "individual or corporation" phrase
have taken the position that either of these terms apply to governmental
bodies. This result is not at all surprising, given the clear legislative intent
18. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
19. Id. at 547.
20. See, e.g., City of Corinth v. NuRock Dev., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); Texas A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 127 S.W.3d 866, 874
(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd); Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty., 901 S.W.2d 783,
786-87 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 839 S.W.2d
at 891; Texas v. Bodisch, 775 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); City of
Terrell v. McFarland, 766 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
21. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 839 S.W.2d at 892; City of Terrell, 766 S.W.2d at 813.
22. Wickersham Ford, Inc. v. Orange Cnty., 701 S.W.2d 844, 348-49 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1985, no writ).
23. Id.
24. Id.




to continue to exclude governmental bodies from potential attorney's
fees liability that is shown by the revisor's note to section 38.001 and the
other legislative commentary that I have discussed above. 26
D. CASES APPLYING SECTION 38.001 TO PARTNERSHIPS
The applicability of section 38.001 with regard to imposing attorney's
fees liability on partnerships is unfortunately less clear. The phrase "indi-
vidual or corporation" on its face would appear to exclude all forms of
partnerships, since they are all legal entities rather than individual human
beings and are not corporations. However, as noted above, the revisor's
note to section 38.001 makes clear that the substitution of the narrower
term "individual" for the term "person" in prior article 2226 was specifi-
cally intended to ratify the prior case law that excluded governmental
entities from potential attorney's fees exposure under the broad Code
Construction Act definition of "person," and there is no indication in the
revisor's note whether a change in the treatment of partnerships was also
intended.27 In addition, as I have noted above, the revisor's note claims
that section 38.001 was not intended to make any substantive legal
changes, but only to recodify the prior law in light of the newly-adopted
broad statutory definition of "person" in the Code Construction Act.28
Given this sparse legislative history, should the term "individual" in
section 38.001 be interpreted in the conventional fashion as applying only
to human beings, or should it be read more broadly to also include at
least some non-governmental legal entities, such as partnerships? The
case law on this point is very limited and has not reached a definitive
position on the question. There are a few appellate cases upholding the
awarding of attorney's fees against either a general partnership 29 or a lim-
ited partnership, 30 including one Texas Supreme Court case,31 but none
of those cases specifically address the difficult issue of whether a partner-
ship qualifies as an "individual or corporation" under section 38.001. The
few appellate courts upholding those awards all appear to take it for
granted that partnerships so qualify when neither party to the appeal
raises the issue, which seems a rather dubious position for the courts to
take without offering an explicit justification given the facially unambigu-
ous statutory "individual or corporation" phrasing that would appear to
exclude partnerships. The earlier 1976 case of Intercity Investment Corp.
26. TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 178.
27. See Base-Seal, Inc., 901 S.W.2d at 786; TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 12,
at 178.
28. See Base-Seal, Inc., 901 S.W.2d at 786; TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 12,
at i, 178.
29. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998).
30. Carlyle Real Estate Ltd. P'ship-X v. Liebman, 782 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); Carr v. Austin Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 269, 272 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
31. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.
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v. Plowman32 also awarded attorney's fees against a limited partnership
under the predecessor article 2226 statute, but that was done applying the
former statute's "person or corporation" language, 33 which was arguably
broad enough to include partnerships even prior to the adoption of the
inclusive Code Construction Act definition of "person," rather than ap-
plying the facially narrower "individual or corporation" section 38.001
phrasing.
In Ganz v. Lyons Partnership,34 a federal district court did consider, in
some detail, the scope of the "individual or corporation" phrase of sec-
tion 38.001 with regard to a limited partnership. 35 That court rather sum-
marily concluded, primarily on the basis of the Lake LBJ Municipal
Utility District v. Coulson and Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson County opinions
(each declining to construe the "individual or corporation" phrase to
cover governmental bodies), 36 that "the phrase [also] cannot be stretched
to include 'partnerships.'"37 The Ganz court did not address the possible
counterargument, which I have noted above, that section 38.001 was ex-
plicitly intended only as a recodification made necessary by the Code
Construction Act that would not make any substantive legal changes. 38
Nor did the court address the argument that the substitution of the term
"individual" for the term "person" by section 38.001 was intended only to
ratify the prior article 2226 case law that had excluded governmental bod-
ies from attorney's fee liability, as is indicated by the revisor's note, and
not to narrow the application of the statute with regard to the liability of
private entities in a manner that would change the substantive result from
that reached in the partnership liability cases decided under article 2226,
such as Intercity Investment Company.39
My conclusion is that one can plausibly offer a simple and powerful
plain meaning textual argument, supported by the Ganz opinion, that
neither general nor limited partnerships 40 are covered under the "individ-
ual or corporation" phrase of section 38.001, and counsel for partnerships
should definitely make this argument when their clients are faced with
potential attorney's fees liability in contract cases. However, such an ar-
gument may not prove successful. A court deciding such a case may con-
clude from the limited legislative history that the substitution of the term
"individual" for "person" by section 38.001 was intended only to continue
32. Intercity Invs. Co. v. Plowman, 542 S.W.2d 260, 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1976, no writ).
33. Id.
34. Ganz v. Lyons P'ship, 173 F.R.D. 173, 176 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 175-76; Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty., 901 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson, 839 S.W.2d
880, 891 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
37. Ganz, 173 F.R.D. at 176.
38. See Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 839 S.W.2d at 176.
39. Intercity Invs. Co. v. Plowman, 542 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
no writ).




the practice of exempting governmental bodies from potential liability for
attorney's fees and not to change the prior law, as articulated in cases
such as Intercity Investment Company,41 to also exempt partnerships or
other non-corporate legal entities, and that courts may thereby reject the
Ganz ruling and hold a partnership liable as an "individual" under sec-
tion 38.001. Such a ruling could also draw some modest support from
those appellate cases noted above that have held that certain partnerships
were liable for attorney's fees under section 38.001, presumably also as
"individuals" rather than as "corporations" (including one Texas Su-
preme Court case). 42 Although, as I have noted, none of those cases ad-
dressed this issue on appeal or offered an explicit rationale for this result.
E. CASES APPLYING SECTION 38.001 TO
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The applicability of section 38.001 with regard to imposing liability for
attorney's fees on limited liability companies is similarly unclear. In addi-
tion to the conflicting arguments discussed above in the partnership lia-
bility context that can be offered regarding the legislative intent of
substituting the term "individual" for "person," there is also the addi-
tional complicating question that arises from time to time in various legal
contexts as to whether the legislature intended that limited liability com-
panies be regarded as "partnerships" or instead as "corporations" for the
purpose of the application of various constitutional or statutory
frameworks that treat those two kinds of entities differently. Such legal
frameworks were often created prior to the development of the limited
liability company legal form and consequently do not specifically address
the legal status of limited liability companies unless they have been subse-
quently amended to do so, even though at the time they were adopted
they were intended to be exhaustive. 43
In other words, even if one concludes that section 38.001 narrows the
scope of prior article 2226 so that the statutory provision no longer im-
poses potential attorney's fees liability on "partnerships," should a lim-
ited liability company be regarded as analogous to a partnership and also
exempted from potential attorney's fees liability on the basis that it is also
neither an "individual" nor a "corporation"? Or should limited liability
companies, because of their corporate-like chartering requirements and
limited liability characteristics, instead be regarded as "corporations"
rather than as partnerships for section 38.001 purposes and thus subjected
41. Intercity Invs. Co., 542 S.W.2d at 264.
42. Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. 1998).
43. See, e.g., Meyer v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 890 P.
2d 1361, 1363-64 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (determining whether a limited liability company
qualifies as a partnership or instead as a corporation for the purposes of state constitu-
tional liquor license restrictions); Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters. No. C.A. 93A-09-005, 194
WL 150872 at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1994) (determining whether a limited liability
company qualifies as a partnership or instead as a corporation for pro se representation
rights purposes).
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to potential attorney's fees liability? 44
The case law here is again very sparse. In Apache Corp. v. Dynergy
Midstream Services, the court awarded attorney's fees under section
38.001 against a limited liability company, but in that decision the court
once again did not specifically address the scope of the "individual or
corporation" phrase nor clarify whether it regarded a limited liability
company as an "individual," a "corporation," or both, since those ques-
tions were not raised on appeal. 45
One can again offer a plausible textual argument such as was accepted
by the court in Ganz in the partnership context that limited liability com-
panies are not covered under the "individual or corporation" phrase of
section 38.001. Counsel for limited liability companies faced with poten-
tial attorney's fees liability in contract cases should definitely make this
argument. As I have discussed above in the partnership context, how-
ever, it is possible that a court that considers this argument may neverthe-
less conclude from the legislative history that the substitution of the term
"individual" for "person" was intended only to exempt governmental
bodies and not non-corporate private entities from potential liability for
attorney's fees, and may thereby reject the Ganz ruling and hold a limited
liability company to be an "individual" liable under section 38.001.
Moreover, even a court that extends Ganz to interpret the term "individ-
ual" to not include either partnerships or limited liability companies may
nevertheless conclude that a limited liability company, because of its
many corporation-like characteristics, should be regarded as a "corpora-
tion" subject to potential section 38.001 liability for attorney's fees.
F. CASES APPLYING SECTION 38.001 TO ERISA TRUST FUNDS
OR TO CERTAIN OTHER PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS
Finally, section 38.001 and its legislative history leave unclear whether
the phrase "individual or corporation" is intended to apply to other legal
entities that are neither partnerships, limited liability companies, or for-
profit private corporations, such as, for example, ERISA trust funds, non-
profit corporations, or certain other forms of private associations such as
insurance trusts. There is only very limited case law addressing these
questions. The leading case applying section 38.001 to a legal entity of
this general nature is clearly Baylor Health Care System v. National Ele-
vator Industry Health Benefit Plan.46 That 2008 federal district court case
dealt squarely with the question of whether an ERISA trust fund could
be held liable for attorney's fees under section 38.001 as an "individual or
44. See, e.g., Meyer, 890 P.2d at 1363-64; Poore, 1994 WL 150872, at *2.
45. Apache Corp. v. Dynergy Midstream Servs., Ltd. P'ship., 214 S.W.3d 554, 565-66
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. granted), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds
in part, 294 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2009).
46. Baylor Health Care Sys. v. Nat'l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, No. 3:06-
CV-1888-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43044, at *15-16 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2008) (mem. op.).
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corporation. ' 47 That court concluded that it could not.48 It found com-
pelling the reasoning of the Ganz opinion, discussed above, that ruled
that partnerships were not subject to liability under section 38.001 and
extended this reasoning to exclude ERISA trust funds from liability as
also not qualifying as either "individuals" or "corporations. '49 The Bay-
lor Health Care System court recognized that there were several earlier
appellate cases that had affirmed rulings that had held various non-corpo-
rate legal entities liable under section 38.001,50 but the court also noted,
as I have discussed above in connection with potential partnership and
limited liability company liability under section 38.001, that none of those
few cases had specifically addressed the precise issue of the scope of that
provision and thus they were not nearly as convincing as was Ganz.51
The Baylor Health Care System court also discussed the fact that when
the Ganz court handed down its ruling, the precise issue of the scope of
the "individual or corporation" phrase of section 38.001 with regard to an
ERISA trust fund had not yet been addressed by the Texas Supreme
Court.52 It concluded that as a federal court sitting as a Texas state court
under the Erie doctrine, it needed to conduct an in-depth inquiry that
went beyond the textual construction rationale that it favored and that
also considered how the Texas Supreme Court would likely rule on this
precise question if it was presented to it.53 The Baylor Health Care Sys-
tem court then conducted such an inquiry and concluded that the results
supported its application of Ganz.54 It reasoned that since the plain lan-
guage of the phrase "individual or corporation" is unambiguous, that
phrase would therefore likely be construed by the Texas Supreme Court
under their precedents 55 to preclude any interpretation that would con-
strue it as broadly as the prior judicial interpretation of the term "person"
under the prior article 2226,56 an interpretation that might well include an
ERISA trust fund.
47. Id. at *13.
48. Id. at *16.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *10-12 (citing and paraphrasing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d
543, 547 (Tex. 1998); Carlyle Real Estate Ltd. P'ship-X v. Leibman, 782 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ); Apache Corp., 214 S.W.3d at 566; Carr v. Austin
Forty, 744 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied)).
51. "[Nlone of these cases address the issue of the recoverability of statutory attor-
ney's fees from a defendant under the 'individual or corporation' language because the
issue was not presented on appeal." Baylor Health Care Sys., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43044,
at *11.
52. Id. at *13. As I have noted, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to address the issue
of the scope of the "individual or corporation" phrase of section 38.001 in any of the diffi-
cult contexts discussed in this Article as of the date of this Article's publication.
53. See id. at *12-13.
54. Id. at *15-16.
55. The Baylor Health Care System court cited to Energy Serv. Co. of Bowie, Inc. v.
Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. 2007); Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v.
Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999); and United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Strayhorn, 124 S.W.3d
722 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) in this analysis of Texas Supreme Court statutory
construction jurisprudence.
56. Baylor Health Care Sys., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43044, at *12.
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A second federal court case involving the application of section 38.001
to a trust defendant was In re Gibbons-Markey.57 In that 2007 case, the
plaintiff prevailed on a breach of contract claim against Texas Medical
Liability Trust, the plaintiff's insurer, and was awarded attorney's fees
under section 38.001.58 The defendant trust argued on appeal that it was
neither an "individual" nor a "corporation" under that provision, so the
attorney's fees award was inappropriate. 59 The court ruled against the
defendant trust on the basis that it had waived that objection to the fees
award by failing to raise it at the trial.60 The court went on to undercut
the logic of this ruling, however, by recognizing that if the statute "simply
does not provide for an award of attorney's fees against a trust," then no
objection would need to be made at trial by the defendant to prevent
such an award. 61 However, as an alternative basis for its ruling upholding
the award, the court also noted that even if this objection to the fees
award had been raised at trial under Texas law lawsuits against a trust are
regarded as also being suits against the trustees of the trust, which in this
case were individuals, triggering the operation of section 38.001 to justify
the award of attorney's fees. 62
Finally, in Stevens v. Anatolian Shepard Dog Club of America, Inc.63
the court refused to award attorney's fees under section 38.001 against a
non-profit corporation.64 That opinion denied recovery on the basis that
the successful plaintiff's award was based not on her breach of contract
claim but on a different cause of action, so section 38.001 did not apply.65
The opinion did not, however, state that an alternative basis for the de-
nial of attorney's fees was the failure of the non-profit corporation defen-
dant to qualify as a "corporation" under section 38.001.66 The opinion
therefore provides at least slender implicit support for regarding non-
profit corporations as potentially subject to attorney's fees awards under
that section.
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE SECTION 38.001 SCOPE OF
COVERAGE JURISPRUDENCE
I am in full agreement with the courts that have consistently inter-
preted the "individual or corporation" phrase of section 38.001 to exclude
governmental bodies from its scope. This reading is in harmony with the
common understanding of those terms and with the expressed legislative
57. In re Gibbons-Markey, 246 Fed. App'x 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 276-77.
60. Id. at 277.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing the Texas Supreme Court in Ray Malooly Trust v. Juhl, 186 S.W.3d 568,
570 (Tex. 2006)).
63. Stevens v. Anatolian Shepherd Dog Club of Am., Inc., 231 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no writ).





intent to continue to exclude governmental bodies from potential attor-
ney's fees liability under the section 38.001 recodification of prior article
2226 and with the general judicial repudiation of the Wickersham Ford
opinion. The law is clear enough here, and no further Supreme Court
rulings or legislative action is needed in this regard.
The court opinions addressing whether partnerships, limited liability
companies, trusts, or non-profit corporations are subject to potential lia-
bility under section 38.001 are much less satisfying. None of the few judi-
cial rulings that deal with these issues address to a meaningful extent the
central tension between the facially unambiguous "individual or corpora-
tion" phrase, which if interpreted in the usual plain meaning fashion
would exclude partnerships, limited liability companies, and trusts that
would presumably have been covered by the prior broader article 2226
term "person" 67 and would also arguably exclude non-profit corpora-
tions, and the legislative history of section 38.001 discussed above, which
indicates to the contrary that no substantive changes of this sort were
intended by the recodification.
In my opinion, this unsatisfactory jurisprudence indicates that either a
clarifying Supreme Court ruling or a legislative amendment is called for
here. The merits of fee-shifting statutes are obviously a complicated and
controversial matter that are addressed at length elsewhere in the litera-
ture,68 and in this short Article I will not take a position as to whether
partnerships, limited liability company, trust, or non-profit corporation
defendants should be subject to fee-shifting. I would like to briefly note
in passing that if any statutory fee-shifting is to take place, I admit that I
personally do not see any compelling reason why non-corporate legal en-
tities should receive preferential treatment as defendants as compared to
individuals or for-profit private corporations. However, in this Article I
will take no position on the question of the merits of fee-shifting statutes
beyond calling for some form of clarification of the scope of section
38.001, one way or the other.
67. See, e.g., Intercity Inves. Co. v. Plowman, 542 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, no writ).
68. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 722
(2010); Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Con-
sequences, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 185-92 (2007); Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fisch-
bach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19
BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 319 (2005); David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Com-
paring, Contrasting and Combining the "American Rule" and "English Rule," 15 IND. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REV. 583, 584 (2005); W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees
in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the "Odd Man Out" in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16
ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 361, 371 (1999); Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Pro-
gress on Attorney's Fees: Expanding the "Loser Pays" Rule in Texas, 30 Hous L. REV.
1915, 1923 (1994); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569-70 (1993); Mark S. Stein,
Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer Than Two-Way Fee Shifting?, 141 F.R.D. 351, 352 (1992);
Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199,
213-216 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Criti-
cal Overview, 1982 DUKE L. J. 651, 651-52 (1982).
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One way that this clarification could be obtained would be for the
Texas Supreme Court to take on a case that raised the issue of the scope
of the "individual or corporation" phrase of section 38.001 in one or an-
other of the contexts that I have discussed above, and then fully address
the interpretive issue presented in that factual context, perhaps also in-
cluding in its opinion some broader dicta providing general guidance as to
its view of the proper interpretation of that phrase in the other related
contexts in which it has previously arisen or in which the question might
arise in the future. A second possibility, of course, would be for the Texas
legislature to simply amend section 38.001 to make its intent more clear.
If the legislature wishes to hold non-corporate private legal entities such
as partnerships, limited liability companies, or trusts liable for attorney's
fees under section 38.001, I would recommend that the "individuals or
corporations" phrase be replaced by the clearer phrase "persons, but not
including governmental bodies." If, however, the legislature wishes that
those non-corporate private legal entities not be held so liable, I would
then recommend that the "individuals or corporations" phrase be re-
placed by the somewhat more cumbersome but clearer phrase "individu-
als or corporations, but not including partnerships, limited liability
companies, trusts, or other non-corporate legal entities." The term "cor-
porations" in section 38.001 could also be legislatively amended to either
"corporations, including non-profit corporations," or "corporations, but
not including non-profit corporations," as appropriate to clarify its in-
tended scope with regard to non-profit corporations. 69
69. H.B. No. 274, introduced in the Texas House of Representatives on March 10,
2011, would have amended section 38.001 to award reasonable attorney's fees to "[tlhe
prevailing party with respect to a claim ... from an individual, corporation, or other legal
entity" in a breach of contract action. H.B. 274, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (as
introduced Mar. 10, 2011). That amendment would thus have broadened the scope of that
provision to clearly subject partnerships, limited liability companies, trusts, and other non-
corporate legal entities to potential liability for attorney's fees. It would also have signifi-
cantly extended the provision to now also include the right to obtain attorney's fees for
those persons who successfully defend against contracts claims. H.B. 274 was eventually
adopted but only after it was amended to remove the proposed changes to section 38.001.
H.B. 274, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (as enrolled May 27, 2011).
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